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This paper studies the incentive eﬀect and entrenchment eﬀect of managerial ownership
in a sample of small and medium–sized companies in the German business–related service
sector.
Up to now, questions of corporate governance have mostly been studied in samples of
large ﬁrms that are listed on the stock market. We address these questions in a sample
of private limited liability ﬁrms (GmbHs). GmbHs are the most important legal form in
Germany. They are characterized by the fact that the liability of the owners is restricted
to the amount of equity capital they invested in the company. Typically, GmbHs are
small and medium–sized companies. We aim to analyse whether the distortions caused
by the separation of company ownership and control are also present in GmbHs.
For our analysis we combine information from a business survey with company data
from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. The data set is an unbalanced
panel of 356 companies from 1997-2000. The survey covers the business-related service
sector and is conducted by the ZEW Mannheim. The companies are asked on a quar-
terly basis whether their proﬁts have increased, stayed the same or decreased in the last
three months. On the basis of these quarterly answers, we construct an annual perfor-
mance measure. The credit rating agency provides us with information about managerial
ownership share deﬁned as the sum of the ownership share of all managers.
We ﬁnd a positive relationship between managerial ownership share and company per-
formance up to around 40 percent owing to the incentive eﬀect. Our ﬁndings suggest that
there are important diﬀerences between public and private companies. For public compa-
nies, very high values of managerial ownership have a negative inﬂuence on performance
due to managerial entrenchment. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd an entrenchment eﬀect for
private companies.Managerial Ownership and Company Performance in
German Small and Medium-Sized Private Enterprises
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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between managerial ownership and company perfor-
mance, testing the incentive and entrenchment hypothesis. Diﬀerently from previous
literature, we focus on small and medium-sized private enterprises which constitute
an important part of the German economy. We use a panel of 356 companies in
the German business-related service sector for the years 1997-2000. Our ﬁndings
are that performance, measured by survey-based proﬁt information, is increasing
in managerial ownership up to around 40 percent. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
entrenchment eﬀect, possibly because at levels at which managers could become
entrenched, they already bear a large proportion of the costs and have therefore an
incentive to maximize company value.
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21 Introduction
Economic theory identiﬁes two opposing eﬀects of managerial ownership – the incentive
and the entrenchment eﬀect. On the one hand, managerial ownership aligns the objectives
of owners and managers because managers then bear a part of the costs of their actions
themselves. From this incentive eﬀect we expect a positive relationship between man-
agerial ownership and company performance. On the other hand, managers with large
ownership shares have the ability to “entrench” themselves because a high managerial
ownership share makes it diﬃcult for other shareholders to control the management and
gives the owner-managers the power to potentially disregard the interests of small share-
holders. Their large ownership share makes them immune to control by outside owners.
If the entrenchment eﬀect is larger than the incentive eﬀect, performance decreases in
managerial ownership.
The emphasis of much of the literature has been large, publicly held US corporations.
Although listed companies play a large role in the United States and in the UK, their
importance for other countries is much smaller. Small and medium-sized private compa-
nies with limited liability in Germany (GmbHs), for example, accounted for more than
33 percent of total turnover in 2000 and their overall importance has increased steadily
in the last thirty years.1 In this paper, we address the relationship between managerial
ownership and performance empirically for a sample of 356 GmbHs.2
GmbHs have one or more owners who enjoy limited liability. In contrast to public
companies, their shares cannot be listed on a stock market. GmbHs are run by managers
who can hold a stake in the company as well. Compared to large publicly held companies,
the ownership share of managers is often relatively large. However, non-managing owners
of private companies usually also have a high ownership share, which makes it likely that
they are well informed. Therefore, the possibility for managers to “entrench” themselves
is restricted, even if they hold substantial ownership shares. This diﬀerentiates private
from public companies. In public companies, ownership is often so dispersed that, for
example, an ownership share of 5 percent can be enough for managerial entrenchment.
At such low levels of ownership shares, managers have not full incentives to maximize
company value.
1See Table A1 in the appendix for more details.
2The counterparts of German GmbHs are limited companies (Ltd) in the UK and closely-held corpo-
rations in the USA.
1For our analysis we combine information from a business survey with company data
from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. The data set is an unbal-
anced panel of 356 companies from 1997-2000. The survey covers the business-related
service sector and is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in
Mannheim, Germany. The companies are asked on a quarterly basis whether their proﬁts
have increased, stayed the same or decreased in the last three months. On the basis of
these quarterly answers, we construct an annual performance measure. The credit rating
agency provides us with information about managerial ownership share deﬁned as the
sum of the ownership share of all managers.
Our empirical speciﬁcation explaining company performance includes managerial owner-
ship share up to the third power and controls for the number of managers who hold owner-
ship shares, the number of outside owners, the number of a company’s bank relationships,
the size and age of the company. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between managerial
ownership share and company performance up to a maximum of around 40 percent of
ownership.
In the context of our analysis we need to be concerned with problems of endogeneity. It
is possible that managerial ownership itself is inﬂuenced by company performance, that is
there is the potential of reverse causality. Since we use panel data, we are able to control
for reverse causality by using lagged regressors. However, unmeasured factors such as
changes in corporate governance might also be driving our results. Whatever unobserved
variable may be driving the relationship between ownership and performance, it is very
likely to drive the relationship between lagged ownership and performance. Owing to
the panel structure of the data set, we are able to take into account unobserved company
heterogeneity that is time-invariant, for example, managerial ability as long as there are no
changes in the management team. By contrast, we are not able to control for unobserved
factors that are time varying.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature is the study of the relationship of
managerial ownership and performance for private companies. Up to now this relation-
ship has mainly been studied for listed companies.3 In general it is diﬃcult to observe the
performance of private companies because data from balance sheets and proﬁt and loss
3See, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Kaplan (1994) for the US, K¨ oke (2000) and
Januszewski et al. (2002) for Germany. Examples of the rare studies for small companies are Ang
et al. (2000), Bennedsen et al. (2000) and Harhoﬀ and Stahl (1995). Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide
evidence on venture capital ﬁnancing of small and medium-sized companies.
2accounts are rarely available. Our ﬁndings suggest that there are important diﬀerences
between public and private companies. For public companies, very high values of manage-
rial ownership have a negative inﬂuence on performance due to managerial entrenchment.
In contrast, we do not ﬁnd an entrenchment eﬀect for private companies.
The theoretical literature distinguishes between insiders, who manage the company,
and outsiders, who supply funds to the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Inside
managers adopt investment strategies that beneﬁt them but reduce the payment to out-
side suppliers of funds. This behaviour is constrained by higher managerial ownership
because this increases the costs that managers have to bear (incentive eﬀect). On the
other hand, for a given ownership distribution, the higher the level of managerial owner-
ship, the more diﬃcult it is for outsiders to control the management. Therefore, the
management has the possibility to “entrench” themselves. Taking the incentive hypothe-
sis and the entrenchment hypothesis into account, the relationship between management’s
ownership share and company performance can be non-linear. At low levels of ownership
the incentive eﬀect can be dominant, that is, there is a positive eﬀect. However, at very
high levels of ownership the entrenchment eﬀect might be more important and the eﬀect
of ownership could be negative.4
This theoretical view is supported by empirical results of Morck et al. (1988) who
investigate the relationship between managerial ownership of the company’s equity and
Tobin’s Q for large publicly held companies in the US. They ﬁnd that Tobin’s Q rises as
managerial ownership increases from 0 percent to 5 percent, as ownership share increases
further up to 25 percent it falls, and then continues to rise again as ownership share
exceeds 25 percent. Other empirical studies support their results qualitatively, although
they do not agree on the exact functional form of the relationship (for example, McConnell
and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Kole, 1995). In addition, the relationship between
managerial ownership and company performance has been found to become insigniﬁcant
after including ﬁxed eﬀects (Himmelberg et al., 1999). This may be due to the trade-
oﬀ between utility maximization of managers and their proﬁt orientation pointed out
by Demsetz (1983). In a competitive environment managers have to pay for their on-
the-job consumption by a reduction in their pecuniary managerial compensation. As a
consequence, managers will not consume while on the job unless the cost of doing so is less
4See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a comprehensive review of the corporate governance literature
discussing the relationship between ownership structure and performance.
3than if they consumed at home. However, with a greater ownership share and loose market
discipline the owner manager has the power to enjoy both on-the-job consumption and
a high salary. In equilibrium, the structure of ownership that emerges is an endogenous
result depending on monitoring costs and incentives. This theoretical view is supported
by the empirical analysis by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who ﬁnd no signiﬁcant linear
relationship between ownership concentration and company performance, measured as
the accounting proﬁt rate.
The previously mentioned empirical studies are all concerned with large, publicly held
corporations. In contrast, Ang et al. (2000) study the relationship between a company’s
ownership structure and its agency costs for a sample of small US companies. Two
eﬃciency measures serve as proxy for agency costs: the ratio of operating expenses to
annual sales and the ratio of annual sales to total assets. They ﬁnd that companies
with an owner-manager have lower agency costs, that agency costs decrease with the
managerial ownership share, and that agency costs increase with the number of outside
shareholders.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 presents
the estimation results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Data Description
2.1 Data Set
The data comes from a business survey in the German business-related service sector
carried out since 1994 by the ZEW and Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating
agency. The industries as well as their industrial classiﬁcation codes are displayed in
Table A2 in the appendix.
The survey is carried out quarterly. A single page questionnaire is sent to about 4000
companies, achieving a response rate of approximately 25 percent. In 1994, when the sur-
vey was launched, a stratiﬁed sample covering all companies included in the Creditreform
database was taken. The stratiﬁcation was done according to company size, region and
sector aﬃliation. A sample refreshment takes place annually.5
5The sample is stratiﬁed with respect to the ten sectors listed in Table A2 in the appendix, ﬁve
size classes (two for East and three for West Germany), as well as with respect to regional aﬃliation
(East/West Germany). For more details of the sample design and the data set see Kaiser et al. (2000).
4The questionnaire is divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part contains questions on the
business development of the companies in the current quarter with respect to the previous
quarter and on their expectations for the next quarter. The second part is devoted to
questions of current economic or political interest. The survey is conducted as a panel.
We merged the data derived from the survey with company information from the
Creditreform database. This database includes detailed information on the ownership
structure of private companies with limited liability. It states the ownership share of
managers and gives the identity of outside owners. Furthermore, the number of bank
relationships a company has is displayed. Other information is the number of employees
and the age of a company. These variables have been gathered on a yearly basis since 1997.
We therefore obtain an unbalanced panel data set that includes observations from 1997
to 2000. The participation pattern is as follows: 20 percent of the companies participated
in all 4 years, 14 percent participated in 3 years, and 24 percent of the companies are
observed twice.
The empirical results are based on 918 observations referring to 356 companies. The
number of observations and companies per sector is displayed in Table A3 in the appendix.
Several biases could aﬀect the data analysis. While the population for the questionnaire
is all registered companies, the response pattern of companies may be correlated with
variables of interest. We check the correlation of ownership and response for 2000. For
managerial ownership share below or equal to 50 percent, we ﬁnd that 35.5 percent of
the contacted companies answered to the questionnaire. For managerial ownership share
between 51 and 99 percent, the response rate is 34.5 percent and for managerial ownership
share of 100 percent, 31.4 percent of the companies answered. We also investigated
whether there is a relationship between the average of managerial ownership share and
a company’s response pattern. Companies that answered only in one year have a mean
value of 75 percent. Companies that answered in two years have a mean value of 72
percent, which is also the case for companies that answered in three and four years. This
response pattern suggests that there is no relationship between the willingness to answer
and the ownership structure. A survivorship bias is present in our sample since we can
only observe proﬁtability for companies that still exist. In an annual sample refreshment
all companies that have not responded in the six preceding waves are deleted. The last
source of bias is the frequency with which Creditreform updates company information.
Companies for which there are more inquiries are updated more often. Again, if the
updating frequency is not related to our analysis, we face no problem.
52.2 Deﬁnition of Variables
The performance measure is based on the responses to the business survey. Participat-
ing companies are asked about the development of their proﬁts, sales, prices, demand,
and number of employees. They indicate whether these variables have decreased, stayed
the same, or increased in the current quarter compared to the previous quarter. For the
purpose of this paper the variable of most interest is the assessment of the company’s prof-
its.6 The performance variable (Performance) is measured as the diﬀerence between the
number of times a company has responded that its proﬁts have increased and the num-
ber of times a company has reported that its proﬁts have decreased. The exact formula is:
Performance:
# of ‘increases’ per company per year − # of ‘decreases’ per company per year
The deﬁnitions of the variables determining performance are as follows (descriptive statis-
tics are shown in Table 1):
• Ownership share of managers (Share) is the sum of ownership shares held by the
management of the company. It is measured between 0 and 1.7
The share of companies that are totally owned by managers varies according to
sector between 32 percent and 61 percent. The average in the whole sample is 45
percent. Excluding companies that are totally owned by managers the distribu-
tion of ownership share is approximately normal, centered around 55 percent and
with relatively more observations above the mean. This distribution does not vary
substantially across sectors.
• Number of Owner Managers denotes the number of managers who hold owner-
ship shares.
6The exact question is: in comparison to the last three months, have your proﬁts increased, stayed
the same or decreased?
7Our considerations always refer to relative ownership share because this is the information included
in our data set. The absolute amount, however, may also be important with respect to the incentive
eﬀects. A 10 percent share of a Euro 50,000 company, for example, may have diﬀerent incentive eﬀects
than 10 percent in a Euro 5 million company. This diﬀerence also depends on the private wealth of the
owner-manager. Incentives increase if a higher share of personal net worth is invested in the company
(see Mueller, 2004).
6• Number of Outside Owners denotes the number of outsiders holding equity.
The ownership share of each outside owner is ceteris paribus smaller, the higher the
number of outside owners.
• Bank is the number of a company’s bank relationships.
• Ln Employment denotes the natural logarithm of the number of employees. The
companies in our sample are relatively small. 78 percent of the companies have
fewer than 50 employees, 14 percent have between 50 and 100 employees and only
9 percent have more than 100 employees.
• Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the age of the company in years.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Performance -0.293 0 1.739 -4 4
Share 0.726 0.850 0.309 0.010 1
No. of owner managers 1.664 1 0.965 0 10
No. of outside owners 1.269 1 1.805 0 16
Bank 1.397 1 0.709 1 6
Employment 44.72 24 65.82 1 800
Age 14.98 10 12.95 2 115
West 0.602 1 0.489 0 1
73 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results on the relationship between company
performance and ownership share of managers. Our regression speciﬁcation includes man-
agerial ownership share up to the third power, the number of managers who hold owner-
ship shares, the number of outside owners, the number of bank relationships, the size and
the age of the company. It is possible that the size of the ownership share of managers
not only inﬂuences company performance but also that company performance has an in-
ﬂuence on the size of the ownership share that managers are willing to take. Managers
tend to be very well informed about the potential of a company before they decide on the
share. This could lead to higher ownership shares in well performing companies and lower
ownership shares in badly performing companies, although one also has to consider that
equity stakes of well performing companies are in general more expensive. In order to take
this reverse causality problem into account, we include lagged values of managerial owner-
ship share into the speciﬁcation. If the major concern of the endogeneity issue is market
timing, for example, then using lags will help. It is conceivable that managers increase
their ownership share on private information that company performance will improve.
However, we additionally need to be concerned about a more general form of endogene-
ity. Some unobserved factor may lead to increases in both ownership and performance.
An example of such unobserved factors is changes in corporate governance, including more
pressure from outsiders or the arrival of a new manager. Owing to the panel structure
of the data set, we are able to control for unobserved time-invariant eﬀects by estimating
ﬁxed eﬀects models.8 Thus, the structure of the data set allows us to address some of the
endogeneity concerns.
Table 2, column (1), shows the estimation results for the basic speciﬁcations that
only addresses the reverse causality problem. This basic speciﬁcation indicates a cubic
relationship between company performance and managerial ownership share.9
8We also estimated random eﬀects models. In a comparison with the ﬁxed eﬀects method, the random
eﬀects method is rejected by the Hausman test. The test is on the null hypothesis that the company-
speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated with the regressors. For example, the Hausman test of the lagged speci-
ﬁcation in Table 2, column (2), has been rejected with a p-value of 0.012.
9Because it is a priori not clear what functional form is appropriate for managerial ownership, we
started with a polynomial including share up to the fourth power. Since the fourth power was not
signiﬁcant, we used a polynomial up to the third power. Here we found the third power to be signiﬁcant
and therefore stayed with this functional form.
8In order to take time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity into account, we extent this
speciﬁcation by including various ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (2) shows the results when com-
pany ﬁxed eﬀects are included. The company ﬁxed eﬀects control for any permanent
diﬀerences across companies in unmeasured determinants of company performance. Col-
umn (3) additionally takes year ﬁxed eﬀects into account and column (4) also includes
year/industry interaction dummies. The year dummies control for the eﬀects of changes
over time in unmeasured determinants which are common to all companies, and the
year/industry interaction dummies consider diﬀerences across industries in the eﬀect of
changes over time in unmeasured determinants in company performance.
The inclusion of the ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the qualitative results of the rela-
tionship between company performance and managerial ownership but the precision of
the coeﬃcients of the additional controls improves considerably.
The functional form of the relationship between managerial ownership share and com-
pany performance is very similar for speciﬁcations (1) to (4). The functional form plotted
in Graph 1 is based on the results of the speciﬁcation including the most controls, shown
in column (4). The positive incentive eﬀect for low values of managerial ownership share
is quite pronounced, whereas there is no clear evidence for a negative entrenchment eﬀect
for high values of managerial ownership share. We further investigate the relationship by
plotting the slope of the function (Graph 2). From the conﬁdence intervals it can be seen
for which areas of managerial ownership share the marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The incentive eﬀect has a signiﬁcant impact on performance up to 40 percent,
whereas the marginal eﬀect is never signiﬁcant for the range of values where the perfor-
mance function has a negative slope. We therefore do not ﬁnd a negative entrenchment
eﬀect for our sample of private companies.
Companies perform better when fewer managers with ownership stakes are involved.
If there are several managers it becomes more diﬃcult to agree on the company strategy
and, furthermore, the incentive provided by the managerial ownership share is smaller for
each single manager.
9Table 2: Managerial Ownership and Company Performance
Dep. Variable: Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share (lag) 5.45** 15.13*** 15.74*** 16.66*** 26.53***
(2.49) (5.20) (5.24) (5.67) (8.19)
Share squared (lag) -10.42** -22.56** -23.57** -25.53** -48.04***
(5.31) (10.99) (10.92) (11.49) (16.31)
Share cubed (lag) 5.60* 10.98 11.51* 12.74* 26.31***
(3.18) (6.75) (6.67) (6.93) (9.61)
No. of owner managers (lag) 0.09 -0.60*** -0.62*** -0.59*** -0.44*
(0.07) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26)
No. of outside owners -0.01 0.19** 0.20** 0.18** 0.04
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Bank -0.06 -0.16 -0.25* -0.28** -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Ln employment 0.08 -0.34 -0.30 -0.16 -0.41
(0.06) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33)
Ln age 0.05 -0.95 -2.45* -3.29** -1.68
(0.10) (0.64) (1.39) (1.47) (1.31)
Performance (lag) 0.14**
(0.06)
Company ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Year industry interaction No No No Yes Yes
No. of obs. (companies): 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356) 918 (356) 580 (361)
F-Test: 1.23 4.10*** 3.42*** 1.79***
(degrees of freedom) (8, 909) (8, 554) (10, 552) (28, 534)
Note: ***,**,*=signiﬁcant on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Column (1) shows the results of an OLS estimation, in column (2)-(4) various
ﬁxed eﬀects are successively included into the speciﬁcation. Column (5) shows Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation results.
10With regard to the eﬀect of outside owners we ﬁnd that performance is increasing in
the number of outside owners. This ﬁnding is consistent with the absence of a signiﬁcant
entrenchment eﬀect, however, it is in contrast to some part of the corporate governance lit-
erature. This literature indicates the importance of monitoring activities, best performed
by concentrated ownership. In contrast, widespread ownership leads to a free rider prob-
lem since there are only weak incentives for individual investors to seek information about
the managers’ work. We, in turn, do not ﬁnd that owners with a large share would be
more eﬀective in monitoring. For the interpretation of this result it is also important to
consider that family ownership is widespread in small and medium-sized companies. It
is very likely that family members who are not part of the management are not so well
informed about the business. If those family members have a high ownership share, they
can easily inﬂuence business decisions which may be harmful.10
Monitoring by banks has a positive eﬀect. Theory does not give an unambiguous
prediction about the sign of this variable. On the one hand, a negative inﬂuence on
performance is to be expected. If a company has more bank relationships, each bank will
ceteris paribus have a smaller loan volume to the company and therefore less incentives to
monitor. On the other hand, a positive inﬂuence on performance is also possible because
companies with few bank relationships may have the problem that the banks try to hold
them up. The ex-post information monopoly provides banks with a substantial bargaining
power (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Banks, therefore, may be able to charge above-market
loan rates. Our ﬁnding is that the more bank relationships a company has, the worse its
performance. This is compatible with the argument that banks with a high loan volume
to one company will spend more resources on monitoring than banks with a small loan
volume. But it could also be that companies with a poor performance need to seek loans
from several banks because no bank wants to make a big commitment. It is not possible
to diﬀerentiate between these two arguments.11
Company size in terms of the natural logarithm of the number of employees does not
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on company performance. Younger companies do, however, show
a better performance than older companies.
10This rather pessimistic view about the business acumen of family members is supported by other
empirical analyses, see for example Morck et al. (2000).
11This result is in line with previous empirical ﬁndings by Petersen and Rajan (1994), who ﬁnd that
companies that borrow from multiple banks are charged a signiﬁcantly higher interest rate. In addition,
concentrating on few bank relationships has a positive eﬀect on the availability of loans.
11Although we regress the change in proﬁts on the level of managerial ownership share
our results do not imply that better companies will grow faster than weaker companies
for ever. Nickell et al. (1997) ﬁnd that competitive pressure has a positive inﬂuence on
productivity growth. Companies that grow faster build up market share over time, but
then they often lose their power to innovate and hence their productivity declines.
We also investigate the dynamic structure of the speciﬁcation applying an Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator. The results are shown in the last column of Table 2. Lagged
company performance has a positive signiﬁcant inﬂuence on current performance, indi-
cating persistence. However, with a value of 0.14 the coeﬃcient is relatively small. This
additional speciﬁcation does not alter our previous ﬁndings regarding company perfor-
mance and managerial ownership, but the signiﬁcance of the additional controls declines.



























Note: 95 percent conﬁdence intervals are indicated. This graph is based on speciﬁcation (4) shown in
Table 2.







































Note: 95 percent conﬁdence intervals are indicated. This graph is based on speciﬁcation (4) shown in
Table 2.
134 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the ownership share of managers
and company performance for German small and medium-sized private companies. Up to
now, most studies on managerial ownership have concentrated on companies that are listed
on the stock market. However, the distortions caused by the separation of ownership and
control may also aﬀect private companies with limited liability. Since this company type
is the most important legal form in Germany, it is crucial to have a good understanding
of the basic corporate governance mechanisms for these companies as well.
We use an unbalanced panel data set of private companies with limited liability in the
German business-related service sector. The main conclusion from our analysis is that
ownership does inﬂuence company performance. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between
managerial ownership share and company performance up to around 40 percent owing
to the incentive eﬀect. However, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant entrenchment eﬀect. This
result is in contrast to previous ﬁndings for public companies that found evidence for the
entrenchment eﬀect. The discrepancy in results can be interpreted in terms of structural
diﬀerences between private and public companies. The ownership share of managers in
private companies is generally quite high. At levels at which they could become entrenched
with respect to outside owners, they already bear a large proportion of the costs. The
incentive to maximize company value therefore dominates entrenchment considerations.
145 Appendix
Table A1: Turnover Accounted for by Companies With Different Legal Form
(in percent of overall turnover)
Type of legal form 1972 1986 1990 1998 2000
Sole proprietor 23.8 15.4 14.9 13.3 12.3
OHG - 6.8 6.8 6.1 6.1
KG - 24.0 23.9 22.4 22.5
GmbH 17.1 25.5 29.1 32.0 33.6
AG 19.1 21.2 20.2 21.5 20.3
Other 7.9 7.2 5.1 4.7 5.3
Note: A sole proprietor is a single entrepreneur with unlimited liability. The OHG is a private company
that has several owners with unlimited liability. The KG has at least one owner with unlimited liability
and at least one owner with limited liability. GmbHs have one or more owners with limited liability.
AGs are companies that are allowed to issue shares. They may or may not be listed on a stock market.
Other includes state-owned enterprises and cooperatives. This information is taken from Statistisches
Bundesamt, 1972 to 2000.
Table A2: The Business-Related Service Sector
Sector WZ 93
Computer Services 72100, 72201-02, 72301-04, 72601-02, 72400
Tax Consultancy & Accounting 74123, 74127, 74121-22
Management Consultancy 74131-32, 74141-42
Architecture 74201-04
Technical Advice & Planning 74205-09, 74301-04
Advertising 74844, 74401-02
Vehicle Rental 71100, 71210
Machine Rental 45500, 71320, 71330
Cargo Handling & Storage 63121, 63403, 63401
Waste and Sewage Disposal 90001-07
Note: The WZ93 industrial classiﬁcation code is a classiﬁcation system developed by the German Federal
Statistical Oﬃce in accordance with the European NACE Rev. 1 standard that classiﬁes economic units
according to their sector of concentration.
15Table A3: Distribution of Observations and Number of Companies
Sector No. of Observations No. of Companies
Computer Services 111 44
Tax Consultancy & Accounting 76 29
Management Consultancy 81 31
Architecture 133 52
Technical Advice & Planning 186 69
Advertising 61 27
Vehicle Rental 73 29
Machine Rental 66 25
Cargo Handling & Storage 66 25
Waste and Sewage Disposal 65 25
Total 918 356
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